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1. Introduction
It has been widely acknowledged that, while mergers of undertakings can expand markets and bring ben-
efi ts to the economy, some mergers may reduce competition to an undesirable extent. Therefore, many 
states, around the globe, have enacted merger control regimes to prevent the emergence of anti-competitive 
market structures. It is typical that merger control rules require that merging parties notify a competi-
tion authority of their transactions before their implementation, whereupon the authority may prohibit the 
merger or impose conditions on the merging parties if the merger causes competition concerns. 
In principle, any state may require the notifi cation of whichever mergers it wishes (whether domestic 
or involving foreign undertakings) or prohibit the same. States may also take enforcement actions within 
their boundaries, but their orders with respect to foreign undertakings generally remain ‘toothless’ abroad, 
where no mechanism for enforcement can be applied. Hence, exercising effective control over extra-
territorial mergers poses challenges to all states.
From the perspective of national competition authorities, four types of merger situations can be dis-
tinguished: i) domestic mergers, wherein all fi rms concerned have their seat within the state of the author-
ity; ii) foreign mergers, wherein the fi rms concerned have their seat in one and the same foreign state; iii) 
international mergers, wherein one of the fi rms concerned is foreign and the other has its seat in the state 
of the authority; and iv) foreign international mergers, wherein the companies concerned have their seat in 
two (or more) foreign states.*2
S mall economies are confronted with foreign, international, and foreign international mergers more 
often than are larger economies.*3 At the same time, their power of enforcement, to give effect either to their 
1 The article is based on the author’s doctoral thesis Implications of Smallness of an Economy on Merger Control, available 
at http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/handle/10062/10282/Paaskatri.pdf?sequence=1 (most recently accessed on 
23.5.2014). The author thanks Michal S. Gal, Rosa Greaves, and Michael Steinicke for their useful comments and Paul Varul 
and Olav Kolstad for excellent supervision. All errors and omissions remain my own.
2 Walter A. Stoffel. International mergers: Merger in small economies. – Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition 
Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham Competition Law Institute, Juris Publishing, Inc. 2007, 
p. 323.
3 Ibid., p. 323.
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notifi cation requirements or to any later merger prohibition, could be rather limited*4, as is exemplifi ed 
below. Therefore, enforcement issues tend to be particularly topical for small economies.
Hence, the aim of this article is to seek ways in which small economies could enhance their enforce-
ment possibilities in cases of foreign, international, and foreign international mergers causing competi-
tion problems in said small economy. The article suggests that within the EU the competition authorities 
of small states facing enforcement issues could benefi t from the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) referral 
regime. This article could be of interest for competition authorities of small economies in the EU but also for 
policymakers in other free-trade areas, who might fi nd it appropriate to consider creating a similar system 
elsewhere.
Proceeding from the aim described, the article is presented in three parts. Firstly, it discusses the prob-
lems of small economies with regard to extraterritorial merger control enforcement (in Section 2). Then, in 
Section 3, it considers various traditional measures, such as co-operation and comity, as means to enhance 
the enforcement position. Finally, it describes the enforcement options within the EU both under various 
enforcement regulations and under the EUMR referral regime (in Section 4).
2. The position of small economies with regard 
to enforcement of merger control
From the perspective of small economies, the enforcement concerns are especially evident in the case of 
mergers of large multinational fi rms. If the merging parties are not seated in the small economy that is 
affected by the merger, the actual bargaining and enforcement power of the competition authorities of the 
small economy vis-à-vis such market players is often rather limited.*5 
Wh ile large economies could enforce their rules by creating obstacles to operations of foreign under-
takings that disregard a merger prohibition or fail to comply with the notifi cation requirements in their 
jurisdiction (e.g., seizure of assets or suspension of operation licences), this tactic is unlikely to yield a satis-
factory outcome for small economies. The main problem is that small economies can rarely make a credible 
threat to prohibit a merger of foreign undertakings. Given that trade in the small economy usually accounts 
for only a small portion of the foreign undertaking’s total world operations, if the small jurisdiction places 
signifi cant restrictions on the merger, the foreign undertaking would most likely choose to exit the small 
economy and trade only in other jurisdictions. Such enforcement issues have been recognised by the mem-
bers of the International Competition Network.*6
This situation is well exemplifi ed by the Unilever / Ben & Jerry’s (2000) case, from the practice of the 
Israel Antitrust Authority. The matter had to do with the acquisition of US ice-cream company Ben & Jerry’s 
by the Anglo–Dutch multinational consumer-goods company Unilever. The merger was subject to control, 
inter alia, in Israel, whose competition authority identifi ed competition concerns in the Israeli ice-cream 
market. The merger was cleared conditionally, after the parties undertook to distribute Ben & Jerry’s ice 
cream through an independent distributor who would be free to determine the prices charged for the prod-
ucts. Moreover, the competition authority required that the quality and quantity of the products be at least 
as high as it had been before the merger and that any new product be made available to the independent 
distributor.*7 Even though such behavioural remedies are generally considered weak options for alleviation 
of competition concerns,*8 no better options could be found for the competition authority in this case. 
This case shows clearly the diffi cult trade-offs that the competition authorities of small economies often 
face in the event of foreign international mergers, as the actual choice of measures is rather limited. Had 
4 Competition Law Forum: ‘Small economies and competition policy—a fair deal?’, summary of conference presentations and 
discussions in Luxembourg, October 2007. 
5 Michal S. Gal. Competition Policy for Small Economies. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press 
2003, pp. 244–246.
6 ICN Special Project for the 8th Annual Conference, ‘Competition Law in Small Economies’, prepared by the Swiss Competition 
Commission and Israel Antitrust Authority, 2009. Available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/
library/doc385.pdf (most recently accessed on 23.5.2014), p. 33.
7 Conditions for the approval of the merger between Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. and Unilever NV, cited through Gal (see 
Note 5), p. 246.
8 For more on this, see Katri Paas. Implications of the smallness of an economy for merger remedies. – Juridica International 
XV (2008), pp. 94–103.
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the merger been prohibited by the competition authority, there would have been a great risk that, instead 
of withdrawing from the transaction, the merging parties would have simply chosen to cease their activities 
in Israel. This would have been even more detrimental for the Israeli consumers than the anti-competitive 
merger. As noted by Michal S. Gal, small economies are often left only to rely on the assumption that inter-
national fi rms will not change their strategic decisions (such as Ben & Jerry’s introduction of new products 
in the world market in this case) only to reduce competition in the small economy.*9 
The above-described conundrum is highlighted also by the economic rationale according to which a for-
eign undertaking would exit the small economy if its loss of revenue from terminating its trade there would 
be smaller than the increase of revenues it anticipates as a result of the proposed merger elsewhere. At the 
same time, the negative welfare effects of the foreign undertaking’s exit from the small economy may well be 
greater than the negative welfare effects of the continued operation of the merged entity within its borders. 
Accordingly, a small economy usually does not have an incentive to prevent the undertaking from trading 
within its borders if it did execute the relevant merger. Aware of this consideration, foreign undertakings 
are unlikely to take into account the effects of their merger on a small economy. They instead consider only 
the effect of the merger on their own profi ts in such markets.*10
If a merger of large international undertakings has signifi cant anti-competitive effects in various coun-
tries, including, for instance, neighbouring larger jurisdictions, it is likely to be prohibited or subjected to 
remedies by other countries’ authorities, and the merger will not take place in the small economy either (or, 
if remedies are applied, the competition concerns would be resolved). Therefore, small economies can rely 
on the merger control of larger economies to a certain extent. However, this can only provide a partial solu-
tion, because the larger economies focus on the effects of the merger on their markets, and the effects of any 
given merger on the small economies may be different and more adverse. Moreover, the enforcement foci 
may differ between jurisdictions. Merger control regimes could pursue various, possibly differing, goals; 
and effi ciency or industrial policy considerations could be taken into account to differing extent. Further-
more, if the merger control of a larger neighbour favours ‘national champions’ and permits an otherwise 
anti-competitive merger on this basis, there is little gain for the small economy, which would suffer from the 
anti-competitive effects of the merger in its markets.
Hence, different states claiming jurisdiction over a merger may have different or even competing goals. 
If the larger jurisdiction hosting the merging undertakings clears a merger that should, from a small econ-
omy’s perspective, be prohibited, there is little left for the small economy to regulate. Depending on the 
circumstances of the case, local remedies could perhaps be applied to rectify the situation in part, but it is 
unlikely that the larger economy that has cleared the merger would be keen on assisting the smaller juris-
diction to enforce its prohibition. The situation could also be the opposite: a merger might be prohibited 
by a large jurisdiction but cleared in a small one. In such cases, either the small economy’s clearance would 
remain unused by the merging parties, in the event that they decide to abort the merger upon the large 
jurisdiction’s prohibition, and the pre-merger situation would remain; or the merging parties could decide 
to implement the merger only in limited scope with respect to activities in the small economy. 
There have been voices among practitioners stating that small economies are ‘overly paranoid’ about 
their inability to enforce their merger regimes. Large undertakings are generally not prepared to run the 
reputation risk of being found to have breached a regulatory requirement. Therefore, companies follow the 
notifi cation requirements of large and small states equally.*11 The author’s experience generally is consis-
tent with this observation. However, while complying with the notifi cation requirements does not generally 
pose signifi cant problems, particularly where the merger is unlikely to cause competition concerns, the 
 situation could prove different in truly problematic cases.
Therefore, the following section analyses the means that can be employed to overcome enforcement 
problems, fi rstly by looking at the issues from a more traditional international perspective, after which the 
same issues are discussed within the context of the EU system.
9 Gal (see Note 5), p. 246. 
10 Ibid., pp. 242–243; OECD Policy Roundtables: Cross-Border Merger Control: Challenges for Developing and Emerging 
Economies, 2011. Available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/50114086.pdf (most recently accessed on 
23.5.2014), p. 343.
11 Speech by James Webber at the Competition Law Forum: ‘Small economies and competition policy—a fair deal?’, in 
 Luxembourg, October 2007.
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3. International co-operation and comity as means 
to enhance merger control enforcement
Faced with globalisation of the economy and with the problems of the application and enforcement of 
merger control rules, international co-operation is gaining increased attention. In pursuit of means to intro-
duce consistent rules and to enhance extraterritorial enforcement, major trading partners have concluded 
agreements, most of them bilateral at present.*12 Such agreements adopt positive comity principles targeted 
at tackling a ‘common evil’ when there is a predisposition to co-operation and to overcome the problem of 
non-enforcement by foreign jurisdictions. However, comity principles have limited effect when the merger 
policy principles adopted by the co-operating jurisdictions differ from one another*13 or where merger con-
trol principles do not take into account the effects of the proposed merger on foreign jurisdictions. 
In addition to co-operation agreements, there have been initiatives established from various inter-
national platforms aimed at increasing co-operation in the fi eld of competition law.*14 However, all rules 
adopted within such frameworks are purely voluntary and non-binding. 
Hence, at this stage, the multilateral platforms do not involve operation of any solid extraterritorial 
enforcement framework as could resolve small economies’ merger control related enforcement problems. 
4. Enforcement within the EU—a solution 
for small Member States?
4.1. Enforcement of the European Commission’s decisions
The EUMR grants the European Commission a rather extensive toolkit for enforcing merger control rules. 
It may prohibit a merger under Article 8 (3), but it also may give conditional permission under Articles 6 (2) 
and 8 (2). Furthermore, where the Commission fi nds that a merger already implemented is anti-competi-
tive or a merger has been implemented in contravention of a condition attached to a clearance decision, it 
may order the merger to be dissolved under Article 8 (4) or. take any other measure appropriate for restor-
ing the pre-merger situation as fully as possible. 
If the merging undertakings do not obey the merger notifi cation requirements or the Commission’s 
decisions, the Commission may impose rather heavy fi nes or periodic penalty payments on the merging 
undertakings as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the EUMR, respectively. The Commission’s decisions impos-
ing pecuniary sanctions must be enforced pursuant to Article 299 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) in the same manner as national judgements in the Member State where the Com-
mission seeks enforcement without any further recognition or other procedures. Hence, the enforcement of 
the Commission’s decisions is rather straightforward and well secured.
12 The best known bilateral agreement regarding the application of competition laws has been in place between the EU and the 
US for decades, since 1991. Further to this development, many bilateral and multilateral antitrust co-operation agreements 
have been concluded between and among various states, around the globe. For more information, see Jonathan Galloway. 
Moving towards a template for bilateral antitrust agreements. – World Competition 28 (2005)/4, pp. 589–614.
13 Mads Andenas, Anestis Papadopoulos. Antitrust law and international companies. – European Business Law Review 12 
(2002)/3, p. 201.
14 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) adopted the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Prin-
ciples and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices in 1980, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) adopted its Recommendations and Best Practices in 1965 (with revisions in 1995). There have 
also been attempts to establish an international competition law regime within the WTO, but, after years of unsuccessful 
negotiations, this idea was abandoned in 2004. In another development, in 2001, various competition authorities, from all 
over the world, established the International Competition Network (ICN), which is a good forum for work toward soft-law 
harmonisation; however, it does not amount to enforcement co-operation in specifi c cases.
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4.2. Enforcement by Member States
Various steps have been taken to facilitate the enforcement of court decisions both on civil*15 and on crimi-
nal matters*16 within the EU and beyond. However, in most jurisdictions, merger control related infringe-
ments constitute administrative or quasi-criminal violations, usually not civil matters or criminal offences. 
Therefore, most of these legal instruments do not apply in cases of merger control related decisions.
Even though the framework decision pertaining to mutual recognition of fi nancial penalties provides 
for the mutual recognition of fi nancial penalties imposed by both the judicial and administrative authorities 
of another Member State, it still does not resolve the merger control enforcement issues. This is because of 
the ‘double criminality rule’, according to which the executing state may make its recognition and execution 
of a decision of an issuing state subject to the condition of the decision being related to conduct that would 
constitute an offence under the law of the potentially executing state.*17 This may not be the case with all 
merger control related violations.
Therefore, if a Member State is seriously concerned about the effects of a merger in its territory and fi nds 
diffi culty in enforcement against undertakings of another Member State, it is worthwhile to consider resorting 
to the merger control referral mechanism discussed below, because this would enable subjecting the merger 
to review by the European Commission, whose decision can be enforced by virtue of Article 299 of the TFEU. 
4.3. Division of jurisdiction between the European Commission 
and national authorities
4.3.1. Division of jurisdiction and referral mechanisms under the EUMR
Article 21 of the EUMR establishes a ‘one-stop shop’ principle according to which mergers with a ‘Com-
munity dimension’—i.e., those above the turnover thresholds set forth in Article 1 of the EUMR—fall within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, with Member States being precluded from applying national 
merger control rules to such mergers. 
The general division of jurisdiction between the Commission and national competition authorities is an 
expression of the subsidiarity principle, which is embodied in Article 5 Treaty on European Union (TEU).*18 
In this light, it is presumed that the Commission is a suitable entity for action with respect to mergers with 
a Community dimension. The high level of the thresholds is meant to imply the intended transaction having 
an effect in several Member States and therefore being most appropriately assessed in a uniform way by the 
Commission.*19 The possibility of re-attributing jur isdiction by using referral mechanisms provides some 
fl exibility to this presumption.
Transactions involving undertakings from small economies are only rarely subject to control by the 
Commission. This does not mean, however, that mergers between undertakings from small economies do 
not have effects in several (small) Member States. The Commission seems to have recognised this, and, 
therefore, in the course of reform of the EUMR, adjustment of the Community dimension thresholds was 
debated.*20 While the thresholds for having a Community dimension remained unchanged, the referral 
15 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22.12.2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, pp. 1–23.
16 There are various examples: ibid.; Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22.7.2003 on the execution in the European 
Union of orders freezing property or evidence, OJ L 196, 2.8.2003, pp. 45–55; Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA 
of 24.2.2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to fi nancial penalties, OJ L 76, 22.3.2005, pp. 16–30; 
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18.12.2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence 
between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, pp. 89–100.
17 The framework decisions cover offences established by the issuing state and serving the purpose of implementing obliga-
tions arising from instruments adopted under the TFEU. This would enable an issuing state to require the recognition and 
enforcement of fi nancial penalties imposed on undertakings for competition-law violations infringing Articles 101 and 102 
of the TFEU, even if such violations do not constitute qualifying offences in the executing state. However, since neither the 
TFEU nor any instruments adopted under it require Member States to establish a national merger control regime, infringe-
ments of national merger control rules are not covered by the framework decisions.
18 Mark Furse. The Law of Merger Control in the EC and the UK. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2007, pp. 51–52.
19  Franz J. Säcker et al. Competition Law: European Community Practice & Procedure. London: Sweet & Maxwell 2007, 
pp. 2300–2301.
20 Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, p. 29; Francisco E.G. Díaz. The reform 
of European merger control: Quid novi sub sole? – World Competition 27 (2004)/2, p. 178.
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mechanisms were revised—pre-notifi cation mechanisms were introduced and the existing post-notifi cation 
referral conditions were loosened.*21
In consequence of the reforms, the current EUMR provides four case referral mechanisms, in Articles 
4 (4), 4 (5), 9 and 22. The table below summarises the distinctive features of the mechanisms envisaged in 
each of the mentioned EUMR articles (or sections thereof).
Table 1: Summary of referral mechanisms under the EUMR
EUMR article: 4 (4) 4 (5) 9 22
Timing
Pre-notifi cation × ×
Post-notifi cation × ×
Referral applicant
Merging undertakings × ×
Commission or Member State × ×
Direction
From Commission to Member State × ×
From Member State to Commission × ×
Articles 4 (4) and (5) allow merging fi rms to apply for referral either of a merger that is subject to the Com-
mission’s merger control to one or several Member States’ control (in Article 4 (4)) or of a merger that is 
subject to control by one or several Member States to the Commission’s control (Article 4 (5)). The applica-
tion for such referral can be made prior to the notifi cation of the transaction to the authority (or authorities) 
having the original jurisdiction. After this, the authorities concerned may either approve or disapprove the 
referral. 
Articles 9 and 22 provide for post-notifi cation referral, which can be applied for by either the Commis-
sion or any Member State but not by merging fi rms. Under Article 9 (2), the Commission may refer a merger 
to one or more Member States if both of the following legal requirements are met:
(i) the merger affects competition in a market
(ii) the market in question is within the requesting Member State, presents all the characteristics of a 
distinct market, and does not constitute a substantial part of the common market
It is possible to refer the whole transaction or only part of it to one or more Member States.*22 As is noted 
above, Member States may request referral also on their own initiative. Having received a referral request 
from the Commission, Member States may either approve or reject the request.*23
From the perspective of competition authorities of small economies Article 22 is the most relevant. 
Under Article 22 (1) one or more Member States may request the Commission to examine any merger that 
does not have a Community dimension, if the following two legal requirements are met:
(i) the merger ‘affects trade between Member States’ 
(ii) the merger ‘threatens to signifi cantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State or 
States making the request’
The request can be made by a Member State alone or by Member States jointly, and any other Member State 
may later join the initial request made by one Member State.*24 If the Commission accepts the request, the 
Member State(s) having made the request may no longer apply its/their national legislation to the merger, 
while Member States that have not joined the request can continue controlling the merger under their 
national rules.*25  
In the author’s view, the Article 22 referral mechanism should be able to alleviate merger control 
enforcement concerns of small EU member states. Accordingly, the conditions for resorting to Article 22 
referral are examined in more detail below.
21 Werner Berg. The new EC merger regulation: A fi rst assessment of its practical impact. – Northwestern Journal of Inter-
national Law & Business 24 (2004)/3, p. 683.
22 EUMR, Article 9 (3).
23 EUMR, Article 9 (6).
24 EUMR, Article 22 (2). 
25 EUMR, Article 22 (3), Commission Notice on case referral in respect of concentrations, OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, pp. 2–23, Sec-
tion 50.
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4.3.2. Opportunities under Article 22 of the EUMR
4.3.2.1. Legal requirements for application of Article 22
As indicated above, Article 22 (1) sets out two main substantive legal requirements that must be met for 
application for a referral. Firstly, the merger should affect trade between Member States. 
According to the standard test developed by the European Courts, the notion ‘may affect’ implies that 
it must be possible to foresee with a suffi cient degree of probability, on the basis of a set of objective factors 
of law or fact, that the matter may have an infl uence on the pattern of trade between Member States. Even 
though such court practice is developed with respect to application of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, 
the Commission has indicated that this practice can be applied to interpretation of the referral conditions 
of Article 22 of the EUMR by way of analogy.*26 The Commission Notice ‘Guidelines on the effect on trade 
concept’*27 provides a good overview of the relevant criteria. In practice, wider than national relevant mar-
kets could also be a factor in argument that the ‘affect trade between Member States’ criterion is satisfi ed.
The Canon/IRIS merger case*28 from the Commission’s practice serves as an example of how the 
Commission evaluates this criterion. The case had to do with the acquisition of Belgian offi ce automation 
equipment provider I.R.I.S. by a Japanese provider of imaging and other electronic equipment, Canon. The 
review of this transaction was referred to the Commission by the Belgian competition authority, which was 
subsequently joined by the national competition authorities of Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Sweden. In the decisions related to the referral under Article 22, the Commission noted that the trans-
action would affect at least the market for portable document scanners. Given the low transport cost, the 
absence of region-specifi c technical requirements, and similar market conditions (including the presence 
of the same suppliers throughout the EEA), the relevant geographic market was likely EEA-wide in scope. 
This statement was consistent with the Commission’s earlier practice. From this basis, the Commission was 
satisfi ed that the referral request showed to the requisite legal standard that the transaction affected trade 
between Member States.
The second legal requirement prescribes that, for the request to be honoured, the merger should threaten 
to affect competition signifi cantly within the territory of the Member State(s) making the request.*29 The 
referring Member State(s) should demonstrate that based on a preliminary analysis there is a real risk that 
the transaction may have a signifi cant adverse impact on competition and, therefore, that it deserves close 
scrutiny.*30 Such risk is considered suffi cient to satisfy this criterion.*31
In the referred Canon/IRIS case, the Commission pointed out that the request from the Belgian compe-
tition authority explained that the proposed transaction threatened to have a signifi cant effect on competi-
tion in the market for portable document scanners in Belgium and also in other Member States. The Bel-
gian competition authority had highlighted that the proposed transaction would lead to a high post-merger 
market share of the merged entity and further increase the concentration in an already oligopolistic market. 
The combined share of the merging undertakings amounted to more than 50–60% in the EEA by both value 
and volume and exceeded 70–80% for both in Belgium. The increment in market share was over 30–40% 
in Belgium and around 10–20% in the EEA in terms of both value and volume. Even though the merging 
undertakings submitted that the market data used by the Belgian competition authority did not accurately 
refl ect the size of the market for portable document scanners (since the sales of a signifi cant number of 
competitors had not been included), the Commission found that verifying the validity of this argument 
required further market investigation. In addition, in light of a comparison of the characteristics and prices 
of the two companies’ respective product ranges, the Belgian competition authority considered Canon and 
I.R.I.S. to be each other’s closest competitors. It was also pointed out that the most important remaining 
 competitor, Fujitsu, was not competitive in the relevant sub-market.
26 Ibid., Section 43.
27 Commission Notice – guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ C 101, 
27.4.2004, pp. 81–96.
28 Commission decision of 18.2.2013, Case COMP/M.6773 – Canon/IRIS. Decisions related to referral were dated 26.11.2012.
29 EUMR, Article 22 (1).
30 Notice on case referral (see Note 25), Section 44. 
31 F.J. Säcker et al. (see Note 19), p. 2459; Trevor Soames, Sylvie Maudhuit. Changes in EU merger control: Part 1. – ECLR 26 
(2005)/1, p. 63. 
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Hence, the Commission concluded that a prima facie assessment indicated that the transaction could 
give rise to serious competition concerns with respect to the supply of portable document scanners within 
the EEA and considered this transaction to satisfy the legal requirements for Article 22 referral. 
Taking into account the foregoing considerations, the Commission accepted the referral and carried 
out a full merger control investigation of the matter. Even though the Commission ultimately cleared the 
merger, because it found that the merged entity would continue to face competition from a number of other 
strong competitors both in the EEA and in individual Member States, the case serves as a good example 
as a case wherein a small Member State’s referral request could have led to a potentially problematic case 
being subjected to the Commission’s review. Had the Commission found after full investigation that the 
merger indeed raised competition concerns, it could have prohibited the merger or imposed remedies on 
the merging undertakings, with enforcement of the Commission’s decision having been effectively secured 
by Article 299 of the TFEU.
4.3.2.2. Other considerations related to application of Article 22
In addition to the legal requirements set out in Article 22 (1), the Commission indicated in its Notice on case 
referral that there are two categories of cases that it considers most appropriate for referral to the Commis-
sion pursuant to Article 22:
(i) cases which give rise to serious competition concerns in one or more markets which are wider than 
national in geographic scope, or where some of the potentially affected markets are wider than 
national, and where the main economic impact of the merger is connected to such markets;
(ii) cases which give rise to serious competition concerns in a series of national or narrower than 
national markets located in a number of Member States, in circumstances where coherent treat-
ment of the case (regarding possible remedies, but also, in appropriate cases, the investigative 
efforts as such) is considered desirable, and where the main economic impact of the merger is con-
nected to such markets.*32
In such cases, the Commission’s powers of investigation and remedial and enforcement action are more 
appropriate than the more limited means available to the Member States. Therefore, the Commission’s 
competence would be in line with the subsidiarity principle, since it represents the most effective means of 
avoiding the creation of obstacles to further European integration.*33
The Canon/IRIS case fell into the fi rst of the above-mentioned categories, because the markets con-
cerned by the merger were broader than national. However, from the small Member State’s perspective, 
a case might be suitable for referral also where the markets are national or narrower than national, if that 
merger has an impact, for instance, for several small (neighbouring) Member States, since it could then be 
deemed to fall into the second category of cases. 
In practical terms, for ascertaining of whether a case is suitable for referral to the Commission, some 
further aspects should be borne in mind. Firstly, the transaction must qualify as a ‘concentration’ within 
the meaning of Article 3 of the EUMR, and it should not have a Community dimension.*34 Hence, minority 
acquisitions falling short of control do not qualify. At the same time, it is not a requirement that the merger 
be subject to control under the national merger control thresholds, as long as the other necessary condi-
tions of Article 22 are satisfi ed.*35 Moreover, a Member State may apply for a referral even in circumstances 
wherein the merger, because it did not meet the national notifi cation thresholds, has been lawfully imple-
mented though not cleared under national law, when that merger has a signifi cant effect on trade between 
Member States.*36 
This aspect of the Article 22 referral mechanism could prove rather helpful and signifi cant for small 
Member States, because it may provide an option of expanding the scope of merger control in some specifi c 
cases. In the author’s practical experience, it is often the case that international undertakings choose not 
to have their own sales enterprises or distributors in all countries and instead use one or several regional 
32 Notice on case referral (see Note 25), Section 45.
33 Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, Sections 17–19.
34 EUMR, Article 22.
35 F.J. Säcker et al. (see Note 19), pp. 2452–2453.
36 F.J. Säcker et al. (see Note 19), pp. 2457–2458.
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distributors for supplying their goods and handling customer relations in smaller markets. In such cases, 
the national merger control turnover thresholds for the merging undertakings might not be exceeded, since 
the undertakings in question do not have direct turnover in the smaller Member States concerned and, 
hence, the merger may escape merger control in such a small state. At the same time, the merger may still 
have signifi cant effect on the competition conditions in the small Member States concerned. Accordingly, 
Article 22 could be used by Member States confronted with such particular circumstances for purposes of 
subjecting mergers of this nature to the European Commission’s review.
Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that the referral request must be made within 15 working days 
of the date on which the merger was notifi ed, or if no notifi cation is required, otherwise made known to the 
Member State concerned.*37 This criterion is a formalistic one and there is no reason why a small Member 
State should not be able to comply with it, if it fi nds out a merger which may raise serious competition con-
cerns for it.
Finally, the Commission has indicated that it will also balance various interests—as the referral may 
entail additional cost and delay for the merging undertakings, referrals should normally be limited to those 
cases wherein a real risk appears to present itself of negative effects on competition and trade between 
Member States, and where it appears that these would be best addressed at the Community level.*38 
4.3.2.3. Assessment of the suitability of Article 22 referrals as a means 
to foster merger enforcement for small Member States
From the above, it does not appear that the Article 22 referral conditions are overly burdensome for Mem-
ber States seeking a referral, provided that the Commission is, in fact, willing to take jurisdiction in prac-
tice. Proving cross-border effects should not pose many hurdles where the merger involves foreign under-
takings but has signifi cant effects in the small economy. Showing such effects may be more problematic if 
the merger involves domestic undertakings, but enforcement is not problematic in such cases, at least with 
respect to extraterritoriality problems, and no referral is necessary.
As of 30 April 2014, there had been, in total, 31 referral requests made under Article 22, of which the 
Commission had refused only four cases.*39 Numerous Article 22 referrals have led to rather heavy scru-
tiny by the Commission. For instance, in the case Kesko/Tuko, involving an already consummated merger 
between two Finnish undertakings operating mainly in the daily consumer-goods sector, the Finnish com-
petition authority referred the transaction to the Commission at a time when no merger control was in 
place in Finland. The Commission found that, in consequence of the transaction, Kesko would have gained 
a dominant position in the Finnish retail markets for daily consumer goods and for cash-and-carry sales 
of daily consumer goods, which would have signifi cantly impeded effective competition in those markets. 
The Commission also found that the transaction would have affected inter-state trade through its infl uence 
on the importation of daily consumer goods into Finland and the creation of barriers to entry for potential 
competitors from other Member States. Therefore, the Commission declared the merger incompatible with 
the common market and required its dissolution.*40 When one looks at the decisional practice of the Com-
mission, it can be concluded that most of the cases that the Commission has reviewed further to Article 22 
referral have been serious enough to be dealt with in Phase 2 and/or have been cleared only conditionally, 
with commitments being imposed.*41
It cannot be overlooked that the application of Article 22 has not been entirely seamless and has 
gathered some criticism from practitioners, especially because of delays and added costs for merging 
37 EUMR, Article 22 (1).
38 Notice on case referral (see Note 25), Section 45. 
39 See the Commission’s merger control statistics, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf (most 
recently accessed on 23.52014).
40 Commission Decision of 20.11.1996, Case IV/M.784 – Kesko/Tuko. Similarly, the Commission found that the acquisition 
by Blokker, a major retail operator in the Netherlands, of the Dutch operations of Toys R Us, one of the world’s biggest toy 
retailers, strengthened a dominant position in the market for specialist toy-retail outlets in the Netherlands, as a result of 
which effective competition was signifi cantly impeded, and declared the transaction incompatible. It imposed divestiture 
orders on the merging fi rms (see Commission Decision of 26.6.1997, Case IV/M.890 – Blokker/Toys “R” Us).
41 See the summary table of Article 22 referrals as of 2011 in Gianni De Stefano et al. Merger referrals in practice – analysis 
of the cases under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. – Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2 (2011)/6, 
pp. 537–550. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpr074.
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undertakings.*42 However, such shortcomings do not reduce its value as a means to resolve merger-control 
enforcement problems for small economies in the EU in the case of mergers having anti-competitive effects. 
Of course, Article 22 cannot solve such problems for small economies outside the EU. However, the EU 
merger control regime and its referral system could serve as an example for other free-trade areas (such as 
Mercosur, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), and ASEAN).
5. Conclusions
The recognition of a state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction depends to a large extent on the good will of the 
undertakings concerned by the state’s enforcement actions and on their home states’ willingness to recog-
nise the enforcement action of the other state. Furthermore, hindering the activities of foreign undertakings 
that disregard merger prohibition or that fail to comply with the notifi cation requirements is also unlikely 
to provide satisfactory outcomes for small economies. Therefore, small economies are in a weak position in 
enforcing their merger control. In some instances, small economies may benefi t from the merger control 
undertaken by large economies, but the interests of small and large economies in controlling a merger do 
not necessarily always coincide. 
As currently applied, the traditional measures in international law, such as co-operation and comity, 
do not provide much help in addressing small economies’ enforcement issues. However, the referral mech-
anism contained in Article 22 of the EUMR, which allows for referring a merger lacking a Community 
dimension to the Commission’s control, could provide solutions for small EU member states when a merger 
has signifi cant anti-competitive effects but the competition authority is concerned about the enforcement 
 possibilities.
42 See, for example, Juan Rodriguez. Merger referrals. Available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/47/sec-
tions/162/chapters/1818/ (most recently accessed on 23.5.2014); Jens Peter Schmidt, Isabel Simon. Referrals of merger 
control cases to the European Commission: Too much fl exibility to the detriment of companies? –Mayer Brown Legal Update, 
23 June 2011, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/referrals-of-merger-control-cases-to-the-european-com-
mission-too-much-fl exibility-to-the-detriment-of-companies-06-23-2011/ (most recently accessed on 23.5.2014).
